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中国土豪“人傻钱多?”—– NO, 且看花430亿美元的中国化工如何精明的分配政府审批风险!

在走出去过程中已经较为熟练掌握国际并购游戏规则的部分中国企业已经彻底的抛掉了“人傻钱多”的形象了,至少从交易文件的风险控制中,可以得出如此的结论。

 

昨日宣布的中国化工集团宣布以430亿美元的交易额并购世界级农化和种子企业先正达公司引发了一波评论狂潮。中国化工集团承诺的30亿美元的分手费也引发外界猜想:难道中国化工要承担所有政府审批风险么?

 

今日公布的要约发布前信息打消了这个疑虑,中国化工在要约中,通过要约条件定量的方式将交易的政府审批风险控制牢牢的掌握在了自己手中。

 

首先,对于反垄断审批来说,如果相关政府机构审批所附条件给先正达公司或其子公司、中国化工或其子公司带来一年26.8亿美元或以上的销售额减少,则中国化工有权退出交易

 

其次,对于美国国家安全审批(CFIUS)或者其他外国政府投资审批来说,如果相关政府机构审批所附条件给先正达公司或其子公司、中国化工或其子公司带来15.4亿美元或以上销售额的之减少,则中国化工有权退出交易

 

第三,中国化工在要约中,对先正达公司发生重大不利事件采取了定量的方式,如果先正达公司在要约收购期间遭受13.4亿美元损失或以上(排除常见的宏观经济和行业事件的影响),则视为重大不利事件发生,中国化工有权退出交易

关于MAC,你可以知道更多:

国际并购交易文件重要条款系列解读之- MAC/MAE条款解读(全文版)

 

囿于要约文件嗣后披露,现在看来,Uncle猜测中国化工所承诺的这个30亿美元的分手费可能仅仅和中国政府的审批相关。

 

在这样的大型并购交易中能够通过定量的方式来控制政府审批风险,其实是在并购交易谈判中比较难争取到的 – 在走出去过程中已经较为熟练掌握国际并购游戏规则的部分中国企业再也不是某些人口中的“人傻钱多”。

甚至,中国公司可能会在跨境交易中创造性的引领并购交易文件中的“Market Practice” - 正如Uncle在《海外并购交易全程实务指南与案例评析》一书中所说的那样:中国企业在跨境并购交易中“只有了解规则、熟悉规则、运用规则,才能完成交易、更好的保护公司的利益;只有了解规则、熟悉规则、运用规则,中国公司才有可能在未来从“学习规则”到“创造规则”;只有了解规则、熟悉规则、运用规则,中国公司才有可能在未来从“创造规则”到“引领规则”。”

对于并购者来说,始终在交易文件中对自身的Exposure定量是非常重要的。

 

你们看看人家中国化工在交易文件中分配风险的技能,学习学习。土豪是土豪,但这个土豪可不傻,精明得很。

 

Merger Clearances and Other  Approvals: All waiting periods applicable to the acquisition of  the Company by the Offeror shall have expired or been terminated and all  competent merger control and other authorities and, if applicable, courts  shall have approved the Offer, its Settlement and the acquisition of the  Company by the Offeror, without imposing any condition or undertaking on  ChemChina and | or the Company and | or any of their respective Subsidiaries  or making their approvals subject to the satisfaction of any condition or  undertaking that, individually or together with any other condition or  undertaking that is relevant under this condition D.1(b) or  condition D.1(c)(i), in the opinion of an independent accounting firm or  investment bank of international repute to be appointed by the Offeror (an Independent Expert), would reasonably be  expected to cause a Regulatory Material Adverse Effect on ChemChina and | or  the Company and | or any of their respective Subsidiaries. A Regulatory  Material Adverse Effect shall mean a reduction of the consolidated sales of one year of  USD 2.68 billion or more.

For purposes of this condition D.1(b), anycondition or undertaking imposed on ChemChina and | or any of its Subsidiariesshall not be taken into account when determining whether a Regulatory MaterialAdverse Effect has occurred, to the extent such condition or undertakingaffects ChemChina’s or any of its Subsidiaries’ agrochemical business existingon the date of this Pre-Announcement.

 

 

(c)

Committee on Foreign  Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Other Foreign Investment  Control Approvals: Neither CFIUS nor any other authority supervising or controlling  foreign investment in any jurisdiction shall have imposed any condition or  undertaking on ChemChina, Syngenta or any of their Subsidiaries that, in the  opinion of an Independent Expert, (i) individually or together with any  other condition or undertaking that is relevant under condition D.1(b)  or this condition D.1(c)(i), would reasonably be expected to cause a  Regulatory Material Adverse Effect on ChemChina and | or the Company and | or  any of their respective Subsidiaries, or (ii) removes (x) all  oversight, management and control by ChemChina, its Subsidiaries (excluding  Syngenta and its Subsidiaries) and their representatives over, or  (y) all physical and other access by them to, assets, books and records,  businesses or operations of Syngenta or any of its Subsidiaries which  contributed to consolidated sales of the Syngenta group an amount of  USD 1.54 billion or more in the financial year 2015.

 

 

(d)

No Injunction: No judgment, decision, order  or other authoritative measure shall have been issued preventing, prohibiting  or declaring illegal the Offer or its consummation.

 

 

(e)

No Company Material Adverse  Effect:  By the end of the (possibly extended) Offer Period, no circumstances or  events shall have occurred, and no circumstances or events shall have been  disclosed by the Company or otherwise come to the Offeror’s attention which,  individually or together with any other circumstances or events that are  relevant under this condition D.1(e), have a Company Material Adverse  Effect on the Syngenta group. A Company Material Adverse Effect shall mean a reduction of  the consolidated sales of one year of USD 1.34 billion or more.

For purposes of this condition D.1(e),changes resulting from general economic conditions and changes generallyaffecting the industry in which the Company and its respective Subsidiariesoperate shall not be taken into account when determining whether a CompanyMaterial Adverse Effect has occurred.

 

 

Uncle所著《海外并购交易全程实务指南与案例评析》将于节后上市,各大电商有售。

一位国际律所的合伙人如此评价《海外并购交易全程实务指南与案例评析》:

This book is a "must have" guide for the reader involved in international oil & gas transactions. Considering the strong practical nature of this book, the reader can undoubtedly grasp the practicalpoint, negotiation points and difficult issues in cross border transactions on reading this book.  

三本电子书,值得拥有:


 

国际油气上游合同实务指南


 

跨境并购交易的实务技巧

成功律师的必备素质

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